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Abstract
In many networks, such as mobile ad-hoc networks and friend-to-friend overlay net-
works, direct communication between nodes is limited to specific neighbors. Friend-
to-friend “darknet” networks have been shown to commonly have a small-world topol-
ogy; while short paths exist between any pair of nodes in small-world networks, it is
non-trivial to determine such paths with a distributed algorithm. Recently, Clarke
and Sandberg proposed the first decentralized routing algorithm that achieves efficient
routing in such small-world networks.
Herein this thesis we discuss the first independent security analysis of Clarke and
Sandberg’s routing algorithm. We show that a relatively weak participating adversary
can render the overlay ineffective without being detected, resulting in significant data
loss due to the resulting load imbalance. We have measured the impact of the attack
in a testbed of 800 and 400 total nodes using minor modifications to Clarke and
Sandberg’s implementation of their routing algorithm in Freenet. Our experiments
show that the attack is highly effective, allowing a small number of malicious nodes
to cause rapid loss of data on the entire network.
We also discuss various proposed countermeasures designed to detect, thwart or
limit the attack. We found that the “darknet” topology limits the ability of effec-
tive countermeasures. The problem of fixing the topology proved so intractable due
to inherent network characteristics that the idea of using a darknet for Freenet has
ii
been all but abandoned following the public release of this work. Our hope is that
the presented analysis acts as a step towards effective analysis and design of secure
distributed routing algorithms for restricted-route topologies.
It should be noted that this thesis is an extended version of the same work presented
at ACSAC 2007. The work appears in the conference proceedings as “Routing in the
Dark: Pitch Black” [19] largely unmodified from this thesis.
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Fully decentralized and efficient routing algorithms for restricted route networks
promise to solve crucial problems for a wide variety of networking applications. Ef-
ficient decentralized routing is important for sensor and general wireless networks,
peer-to-peer overlay networks and theoretically, next generation Internet (IP) rout-
ing. A number of distributed peer-to-peer routing protocols developed in recent
years achieve scalable and efficient routing by constructing a structured overlay topol-
ogy [11, 20, 34, 43, 56]. However, none of these designs are able to achieve these goals
in real-world networks with restricted routes. In a restricted route topology, nodes
can only directly communicate with a subset of other nodes in the network. Although
many P2P (peer-to-peer) networks [8, 11, 14, 17, 34, 56, 61] make the assumption
that any peer can communicate directly with any other peer, this is generally untrue
in actuality. Such restrictions can arise from a variety of sources, such as physical
limitations of the communications infrastructure (wireless signals, physical network
topology), network policies (firewalls) or limitations of underlying protocols; for ex-
ample NAT [4]. The most common of these is NAT (network address translation)
which is widely used by home Internet service and business networks alike and makes
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arbitrary direct communication virtually impossible. Specifically, a computer that is
behind a NAT can communicate with a non-NAT’ed computer as long as the NAT’ed
peer initiates the communication. However the reverse is not true unless the NAT box
has been configured to allow incoming communications (such as by port forwarding
or otherwise). Similarly two NAT’ed peers are typically unable to communicate with
each other without some intermediary set up to perform forwarding. Techniques for
dealing with NAT have been proposed and implemented [46, 47, 55], but they are
not perfect solutions, and not ubiquitous enough to solve the restricted routing prob-
lem that NAT creates. This prevalence of NAT makes applications unable to assume
universal connectivity, even though this was the main problem that the Internet’s
routing infrastructure was created to solve (that any two peers can communicate)
but unfortunately we must deal with the networks as they are and not as we would
like them to be.
Recently, a new routing algorithm for restricted route topologies was proposed [50]
and implemented in version 0.7 of Freenet, an anonymous peer-to-peer file-sharing
network [7]. The proposed algorithm achieves routing in expected O(log n) hops for
small-world networks with n nodes and O(log n) neighbors1 by having nodes swap
locations in the overlay under certain conditions. This significant achievement raises
the question of whether the algorithm is robust enough to become the foundation for
the large domain of routing in restricted route networks. Any peer-to-peer network
operating on the Internet (or really any network) must be able to cope with malicious
and byzantine nodes in the overlay that for whatever reason do not follow the correct
protocol. For our purposes we will consider Freenet 0.7 “robust” if the inclusion of
peers that outwardly appear to follow the protocol (but actually do not) are limited
in the harm that they can do to the network.
1Given only a constant number of neighbors, the routing cost increases to O(log2 n).
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The research presented in this paper shows that any participating node can severely
degrade the performance of the routing algorithm by changing the way it participates
in the location swapping aspect of the protocol. Most of the guards in the existing
routing implementation are ineffective or severely limited and in particular fail to re-
liably detect the malicious nodes. Experiments using a Freenet 0.7 testbed show that
a small fraction of malicious nodes can dramatically degenerate routing performance
and cause massive content loss in a short period of time. Our research also illuminates
how churn impacts the structure of the overlay negatively, a phenomenon that was
observed by Freenet 0.7 users in practice but had never been adequately explained
by the time that we finished our research.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes related work focusing on
distributed hash tables and small-world networks. Chapter 3 details Freenet 0.7’s
distributed friend-to-friend (or, as termed by the Freenet authors, “darknet”) routing
algorithm for small-world networks. The proposed attack is described in Chapter 4,
followed by experimental results showing the effects of the attack in Chapter 5. Pos-




In this section we first describe DHT’s (distributed hash tables) and some of the P2P
networks that were created based upon them. Freenet 0.7 is an implementation of a
DHT so it is therefore important to understand a bit about them before introducing
how Freenet 0.7 works. Background on other DHT systems is also useful for com-
parison with Freenet 0.7. Two things that are lacking from the basic DHT designs
are the ability to route in restricted route topologies and security. We touch on these
topics in this section as well, as Freenet’s goals include both.
2.1 Distributed hash tables
A distributed hash table is a data structure that enables efficient key-based lookup
of data in a peer-to-peer overlay network. Generally, the participating peers maintain
connections to a relatively small subset of the other participants in the overlay. Each
peer is responsible for storing a subset of the key-value pairs and for routing requests
to other peers. In other words, a key property of the use of DHTs in a peer-to-peer
setting is the need to route queries in a network over multiple hops based on limited
knowledge about which peers exist in the overlay network. Part of the DHT protocol
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definition is thus concerned with maintaining the structure of the network as peers
join or leave the overlay.
All data in a DHT is identified by some semi-unique value (this uniqueness usually
comes from the use of a hash function, such as SHA or MD5, meaning that while
collisions are possible they are very unlikely) which is commonly referred to as a
key. This unique value comes from the large distribution of values that are possible
outcomes of the hashing function. For an idea of how large, SHA-0 and SHA-1 have
264 possible values. All peers or nodes in the network are also identified by a unique
value from the same distribution known as the node’s location or identifier. We
use the term location and identifier interchangably through this thesis. In this way
all nodes and data are separately and uniquely identifiable in the network. DHT’s
support two logical operations; a PUT operation (which inserts data identified by
some key into the DHT) and a GET operation (which given a key returns data from
the network).
There are some common properties that DHT’s designs can be categorized by.
One property which is a concern of all modern DHT designs is efficiency. Efficiency is
defined in terms of the number of nodes a message must be routed to or through before
the data that is being looked for is found. This measure is referred to as the number
of “hops” a query must travel before data is found. There are two kinds of reliability
that DHT designs take into account. The first is the reliability of the overall network;
that it is able to remain operational in the presence of adversaries. The second is a
matter of keeping data in the network reliably. This concerns distributing data across
the network so it cannot be lost unless all nodes go down, or that data remains in
the network as nodes go offline (which is a matter of replication). DHT’s are also
good at load balancing, or the distribution of responsibility. This spreads the costs
of storing and retrieving data in the network across all nodes that are participating,
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which could mean more total load could be handled or no single node has to bear
the whole burden. Finally, DHT designs should take into account scalability which
means that the network retains its properties of efficiency, reliability, etc. for different
total numbers of nodes.
Efficiency in a DHT is directly tied to the routing algorithm, or the steps that each
node carries out in order to perform GET or PUT requests. There are two main types
of routing algorithms that are employed; iterative routing and recursive routing. In
iterative routing the node that initiates the query controls where the next hop goes at
each step. In recursive routing the message is forwarded by intermediate nodes and
the initiator only receives (or does not receive) the final reply. For a simple example
of these two types of routing, assume three nodes, a, b and c. Assume that a knows
b, b knows c and a is searching for data stored at node c. In iterative routing, node
a contacts b requesting the data, b responds to a that it doesn’t have the data, but
knows another node, c and sends to a c’s contact information. Node a then contacts
c directly and finds the data. In recursive routing, node a contacts b with the same
request, but b forwards the request directly to c, with the same result. So in iterative
routing the path from node a to node c goes a→ b→ a→ c and in recursive routing
goes a→ b→ c.
2.1.1 Skip Lists
Skip lists are basically sorted linked lists in which items have additional pointers
which allow much more efficient lookup of items in the list [41]. When searching a
normal ordered linked list, unlike an ordered array where a binary search can be used,
every node must be iterated over in order to verify the presence of an item. However,
if additional pointers are stored at each entry in the linked list that point to nodes
further forward than the next immediate node the total search time can be greatly
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reduced. This means that if a node in the linked list is at position i it normally only
holds a pointer to i+ 1 (and i−1 if doubly linked). In a skip list the node at position
i holds additional pointers to nodes at positions i + n, i + k, ... Skip lists can give
lookup costs of O(log n) based on how many additional pointers are stored, which
allows DHT’s an easy way of achieving the same average performance when routing
is based on these augmented linked list structures.
The simplest DHT implementation based on skip lists is a circular linked list where
each element in the linked list is stored at a different physical node (and each node is
running on a different host computer). If each node only had a “pointer” to the next
node (where by pointer we mean the required information to connect over the network
to the DHT software) we would have a DHT that could be used as a circular linked
list. Of course, storing a single value per node and requiring O(n) steps to find the
value would probably be a waste of effort. So this simple idea is extended by having
multiple values stored at each node, and by giving each node extra connections to
other nodes in the linked list. By using these extra connections we can essentially use
a skip list over a network. In this way we can see how this example DHT and skip
lists are virtually the same thing, and DHT’s such as [11, 56] are simply extensions
of this idea.
2.1.2 Scalable Content Addressable Network
The first DHT described herein is the Scalable Content Addressable Network
(CAN)[43]. CAN imposes structure onto the unstructured underlying network by
assigning zones in some d-dimensional coordinate space where a zone is a rectangle,
rectangular prism and so forth depending on the number of dimensions. The diagram
in Figure 2.1 shows a 2-d coordinate space although any number of dimensions are
usable. In a 2-d space, the plane is divided into zones where each node n is respon-
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sible for at least one such zone. Being responsible for a zone means that a node will
store any data that hashes to a point in that zone. The neighbors of a node n are the
nodes which overlap in one axis and abut in another (in our 2-d space). The CAN
is constructed by nodes splitting their current zones in half to allow new nodes to
join. As described earlier for DHT’s in general, each node and data item in CAN is
identified by a random location, in the case of CAN it is some point in the coordinate
space.
The construction of CAN starts from a single node, which has a location and is
initially responsible for the entire coordinate space (a single zone encompassing the
entire space). When the second node joins, the first splits its zone in half, then notifies
the new node of the space for which it will be responsible. This happens whenever
a new node enters the CAN; it generates a random point in the coordinate space,
and some other node that is currently responsible for that point splits itself apart to
give the new node a zone. The new node’s routing table is filled from information
given by the split node, as it necessarily knows the adjacent nodes of the new space.
The split node simply removes those nodes that it no longer needs and adds the new
node to its routing table. Routing in CAN is done recursively, when a GET or PUT
request comes into a node (either from another node or a client application), the node
projects a line from its own location to the location of the request destination and
forwards the message on to the first neighbor that the projected line travels through.
In this way, the message eventually reaches the node responsible for the zone in which
the point lies and can respond to the query, or store the data. Figure 2.1 shows the
nodes and selected neighbor relationships for nodes in a 2-d space in order to illustrate
these ideas. The example also shows the path that routing through the CAN takes
based on each node choosing the neighbor that is first encountered by drawing a line




















Figure 2.1. This figure shows an example of how nodes could be laid out in a CAN
network. The full neighbor set for node 2 is {6, 21, 1, 7, 20, 13}. Remember that 20, 13
are neighbors because the space is structured as an n-d torus (with n = 2). Also
shown (in dashed lines) is the nodes along the routing path that results when node 2
searches for data which hashes to point (x, y). The solid line shows an example of
how node 2 chooses which node to initially route to.
Provided that there are no byzantine nodes in the CAN network the CAN address
space is partitioned evenly on average between all the nodes in the network. Nodes
that depart gracefully transfer their zone to either a node which can merge with the
old zone and make a valid zone, or the neighbor node with the smallest volume tem-
porarily takes over the old zone. A background maintenance protocol runs that checks
for node liveness, and if a node is discoverd to no longer be online (or reachable), the
smallest neighbor or a neighbor that can make a new valid zone from the old takes
over the zone left behind. The background protocol also runs at each node to try
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to find “misshapen” zones and repartition them into valid zones in the coordinate
space. CAN as described has an average routing cost of O(n−d) messages. Due to
the even partitioning of the address space based on zones and linking storage to the
zones gives CAN scalability, because as more nodes are added the zones get smaller
and spread the storage cost equally across all nodes. Allowing for multiple CANs to
coexist and for more than one node to “share” a zone can give CAN good reliability
and replication in the face of node departures. CAN does degrade to flooding the
network with expanding ring queries when too many nodes leave in a short period,
which means that CAN is not the best system for networks with lots of nodes joining
and leaving frequently.
2.1.3 Kademlia
Kademlia was mainly created to improve upon previous DHT designs that were
available at the time. The The biggest difference between Kademlia and these earlier
DHT designs [48, 56] is that it uses the XOR operation to determine distance between
elements in the key space. This means that given two nodes in the network the
distance between any two nodes a, b is given by the value of the two XOR’ed together
Da,b = L(a) ⊕ L(b) where L(x) is the location of node x. Pastry uses two different
metrics for deciding how close keys in the address space are to each other (as discussed
in 2.1.5). One of Kademlia’s goals is to unify multiple distance metrics into a single
metric that can be used for routing from start to finish. As in all early DHT designs,
a Kademlia node is assumed to be able to connect to any other live node in the
system at any time. Kademlia achieves its routing performance from the property
that all the keys in the address space can be ordered into a binary tree. Binary trees
are known to have O(log n) search times and this allows Kademlia to locate keys in
the address space in a short time, provided that the routing tables are sufficiently
10
populated.
Kademlia’s routing table is structured as a certain number of so called k-buckets,
of which there are as many k-buckets as there are bits in the locations of nodes (i.e. a
160 bit location means 160 k-buckets per node). Each k-bucket can hold an arbitrary
(but set by a parameter) number of triples which contain the necessary information
to connect to another node, specifically the IP address, port, and location of the
node. For each k-bucket i, the node stores other nodes information whose locations
are between 2i and 2i+1 distance from the storing node’s location. These buckets get
populated whenever a node receives a query from any other node. When a query
is received the querying node’s pertinent information is stored in the k-bucket that
corresponds to its location on the side of the node receiving the query. The k-buckets
are maintained such that the least recently seen node will get bumped out first if the
bucket is full and another node that belongs in the same bucket is encountered (but
only if the least recently seen is unresponsive, otherwise the new node information
is discarded). Routing in Kademlia is iterative; there is no forwarding of queries
between nodes. To understand how Kademlia nodes find keys in the address space it
is important to know how the routing tables are constructed. When a node first joins
the network it creates its own random location. A node that is joining the network
must have knowledge of at least one other node’s IP address and port a priori. The
new node connects to whatever node or nodes it knows. This node may have any
location, and the distance to the new node can be any number in the address space.
Once the new node has connected to at least one peer it sends a request out to its
peer(s) to find out what other nodes in the network exist that have locations closest to
the new node’s location. The distance is determined by the metric mentioned above.
Assume that this new node, z, has only one pre-known peer to connect to, x. Once z
has generated its random location, it connects to x asking for any and all nodes (up
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to some limit parameter j set by each node) that x knows of that are closest to z’s
location. The first thing that x does is check its k-buckets and insert z if necessary.
Then x responds to z with the closest j nodes that x knows of (or less than j if x has
less than j total nodes in all its k-buckets). z then adds all the nodes it has learned
about from x to its k-buckets appropriately. Now z can repeat this process and query
any of the new peers it has discovered for their closest j nodes to its location until it
has either enough nodes total in its k-buckets or until it has as many within a certain
distance of its own location as specified as a system or user parameter. The same node
discovery process is employed when a node performs a GET request. The node takes
a key that is to be searched for (based on hashing or some arbitrary method) and then
queries j peers closest to the key’s value based on those that it knows about (those
that are stored in its k-buckets). Each peer that receives this query either responds
with its j closest peers to the key or with a “data found” response (if it happens to be
holding the data). Routing in Kademlia achieves good performance in part due to the
binary tree structure inherent in the graph. Proving the effectiveness of the routing
in Kademlia requires one major assumption, that if we divide the binary tree that
makes up the Kademlia graph into first two sub-trees divided at the root (into node
locations starting with a 0 or 1), then in the half that is different from a particular
node’s location, the node will have at least one contact in that sub-tree. Put simply,
a node whose first identifier bit is 0 is guaranteed to have a node in it’s routing table
whose first identifier bit is 1. Further, if we traverse one node down towards the
actual nodes location and split in half again, any node is again guaranteed to have a
contact in the sub-tree not containing its own location.
Figure 2.2 shows how this division looks in a concreate visual example of a binary
tree. Once these connections are assumed to exist it is easy to see that whatever key
a node is looking for, it will be able to find a node half as close as itself by prefix (at
12
least) in a single query to a node in the correct sub-tree. Again, this node is assumed
to exist in the routing table. Figure 2.3 shows an example of the queries involved and
the routing in Kademlia.
Figure 2.2. This figure shows the binary tree representing nodes in a Kademlia topol-
ogy. The node in black is the node we are looking at, and the gray circles represent
sections of the graph in which this node is assumed to have a contact. (From [34])
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Figure 2.3. This figure shows the steps a node takes when searching for a key in the
Kademlia topology. The node in white (identified by 001) is searching for the node in
gray (101). The first query from 001 goes to node 110 (which shares the prefix 1 with
101), which then sends the node information for node 100 (which shares the prefix 10
with the target), which then sends back the node information for 101 back to the original
node and the connection can happen directly between 001 and 101. It is easy to see
that by increasing the matching prefix size by 1 bit the address space is cut in half at
each step. (From [34])
2.1.4 Chord
Chord is an early DHT system that was developed to be simpler in terms of routing
and routing table maintenance than previous systems yet achieve nearly the same
performance. Chord’s topology is most easily explained using points plotted on a
circle. Assuming that a node location can be mapped to some point on the circle,
the node maintains routing information for the next immediate node on the circle
in clockwise direction (its successor) and for the next immediate node in counter-
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clockwise direction (its predecessor). All nodes are responsible for any data whose
key lies on the circle between the node’s location and the location of its predecessor.
Therefore routing is a straightforward forwarding in a clockwise direction until the
node that is responsible for the data is found, i.e., the key identifying the request
lies between a node and its predecessor. Routing in Chord is done recursively, and
nodes are expected to forward requests on in clockwise order as they are received.
The topology is maintained as nodes join and leave the network by simply shifting
the predecessor and successor node information at each node, as would be done in a
doubly linked list. The routing table for each node keeps information for peers that
are further away than their successor to achieve better routing performance in skip
list fashion (Chord is literally an implementation of a distributed skip list). Similarly,
when a node leaves unexpectedly (without informing its neighbors) there are steps
that need to be taken, basically by periodically sending out keepalive messages to
make sure neighbors are live. If a neighbor is discovered to have gone offline, the
next peer along the circle must be found to replace it in the routing table. Figure 2.4
shows an example set of nodes in a Chord topology to help illustrate the predecessor
and successor relationships between nodes.
2.1.5 Pastry
Pastry is another early DHT peer-to-peer system. Pastry uses network locality as a
way to help refine its routing table entries. Pastry builds a similar topology to other
systems detailed here but arguably has the most complicated system for maintaining
its list of neighbor nodes or routing table(s). As with other DHT’s, each Pastry node
has a random location that it uses to identify itself. Similar to Kademlia 2.1.3, Pastry
uses prefix matching when searching for close locations in the network. Pastry uses
















Figure 2.4. This figure shows three nodes in a Chord topology along with their simple
predecessor (pred(x) = node location that is the predecessor of node with location x)
and successor (succ(x) = node location that is the successor of node with location x)
relationships
neighbor whose location has a longer matching prefix than its own location. However,
Pastry uses the numerical difference between locations for forwarding when a query
reaches the point that a node has no neighbor with a longer matching prefix than
itself.
Pastry maintains a routing table that is made up of three parts, a routing table
(R1), a neighborhood set (R2) and a leaf set (R3). The R1 set of neighbors is the
largest part of the routing table, with log2b N rows where b is a system wide parameter
and N is the number of nodes. Finding a good estimate of the number of nodes in the
system at a given time is difficult in itself, but there are methods which attempt to do
so [23, 33]. Each row of R1 has 2b − 1 possible entries, where the ith row has entries
of peers that have a location with the first i+ 1 digits matching the node’s location.
This table is built when the node enters the network by (assuming a connection to
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one node a priori) issuing a special join query which, based on the greedy routing
algorithm, will reach the nearest current node in the system. All nodes along the
path send back their complete routing tables to the new node and based on matching
prefix length and some network proximity metric (IP routing hops as described for
the original version of Pastry) is used to build the R1 part of the routing table. The
R2 and R3 sets are created in a similar manner to the R1 set. However, the R2 set
contains m peers (where m is a system or configuration parameter) that are closest
in terms of the locality metric that is being used. The R3 set contains the closest m
nodes whose locations are greater than the node’s location, and the m closest nodes
whose locations are less than the node’s location. The R3 set is the first set used in
the greedy routing algorithm, followed by the R1 set if the key being searched for
does not fall within the range of values in the R3 set. The R2 set is used only for
maintaining locality measures and is used when deciding which nodes to keep in the
R1 set.
The R2 set is not used for updating either the R1 or the R3 sets directly; rather if
two nodes are in contention for a place in R1, and one of them is closer in proximity
(i.e. it is in the neighborhood set) the closer is chosen to hold that spot in the table.
Pastry assumes that a locality metric is available which can give a measure of how
close or far a node is according to some measure. In this way after building the R1,
R2, and R3 tables, both R1 and R2 are continuously checked based on this proximity
metric to ensure that the locality properties hold. This is necessary because network
locality metrics such as routing hops are not necessarily transitive. A node builds its
initial R2 and R1 sets from nearby nodes (and they should report only their closest
nodes), sometimes locality is different for the new node. In other words, if a node X is
close to Y , and Y is close to Z, it is likely but not always the case that X is also close
to Z. Or X could be closer to Z than Y . In either case, the node X verifies these
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locality measures to make sure that the routing tables stay up to date and correct.
Thus the Pastry overlay is constructed. Figure 2.5 depicts an example of the entire
routing table for a Pastry node in a network of 4-bit identifiers, and Figure 2.6 shows
only the R1 portion of a different node in a network with 16-bit identifiers, only in a
more intuitive manner which may make it easier to see how neighbors are ordered.
Figure 2.5. This figure shows the routing table for the node with the location 10233102.
R1 shows the closest nodes based on matching prefix, R2 shows the closest nodes
in terms of locality (IP hops) and R3 shows the closest nodes based on numerical
distance.
2.1.6 Secure DHT’s
Security in routing is another problem that needs to be dealt with in P2P networks.
In the networks described in this section security is generally not a consideration. But
ideally a network must be able to guarantee a route around and/or find data in the




















































































































































































































Figure 2.6. This figure shows only the R1 portion of a pastry routing table for a node
whose location begins with 65a1 as it shows more clearly how each level of the routing
table contains more “close” entries based on prefix.
present in the network, and have a reasonably random distribution of node identifiers
(locations). Also the network protocol should not allow peers to use a larger amount
of CPU or bandwidth than they provide to the network. There are examples of these
types of attacks (and possible solutions) for most of the DHT networks in use today.
A typical way to “secure” a DHT is to assume that a trusted third party exists that
can perform operations for the peers in the overlay. This trusted third party would
perform operations such as distributing node locations, possibly public key cryptog-
raphy information and determining malicious behavior and banning nodes from the
network. Unfortunately a trusted third party is rare come by in the world of P2P
networks, due to the high cost (either monetary or CPU/bandwidth) of using one.
P2P file sharing networks based on DHT’s are free, and users are unwilling to pay
for a third party. A Byzantine agreement protocol [30] could be used to create a
virtual trusted third party but agreement requires prohibitively large communication
overhead. Achieving routing robustness (routing around faulty/malicious nodes) and
guaranteed storage is typically accomplished by randomizing routes along multiple
paths and replicating data at multiple peers as well. Randomizing routes means that
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identical queries can be forwarded to different nodes; as long as a correct peer is
forwarding the query it will continue towards the correct destination [12]. Similarly,
replicating data at multiple nodes in the network thwarts attempts at deleting, mod-
ifying or blocking access to any piece of information. In many networks replication
is non-trivial because sybil [15] attacks must be considered. A sybil attack is a type
of attack where a node in a network can imitate or run a group of colluding nodes
and perform some of the attacks that replication is meant to prevent. For example, if
nodes can choose their own identifiers in the network and replication is not sufficiently
randomized, a group of nodes whose identifiers are clustered around a desired data
item can still control that piece of data. Sybil attacks can also partition networks
and control requests coming from specific peers in the same way.
One way to ensure data remains in a network is to use some form of BFT (Byzantine
Fault Tolerant) replicated data storage to maintain state in the system [36]. The
main problem with this type of system is that it can handle only up to 1
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of faulty
nodes. Most P2P systems have very little protection against one malicious adversary
impersonating many nodes in the system. Without a trusted third party this remains
a problem for a BFT type of solution. Redundant or randomized routing is a rather
good solution to the problem of finding routes around malicious (or byzantine) nodes
in the network, but it comes at the cost of efficiency. Generally it takes more messages
and hops to route past bad nodes, although the tradeoff may be worth it considering
otherwise data may not be found. While several papers have looked at the problems
inherent in DHT security and proposed solutions [5, 12, 27, 49, 53] the issues are
truly only mitigated at best, and secure routing remains an open problem.
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(1) Messages required for each key lookup
(2) Messages required for each store operation
(3) Messages needed to integrate a new peer
(4) Messages needed to manage a peer leaving
(5) Number of connections maintained per peer
(6) Topology can be adjusted to minimize per-hop latency (yes/no)
(7) Connections are symmetric or asymmetric
Table 2.1. Performance metrics for DHTs.
Chord [56] Pastry [48] Kademlia [34] CAN [43] RSG [20]
(1) O(log n) O(log n) O(log n) O(n−d) O(log n)
(2) O(log n) O(log n) O(log n) O(n−d) O(log n)
(3) O(log2 n) O(log n) O(log n) O(d+ n−d) O(log n)
(4) O(log2 n) O(1) O(1) O(d) O(log n)
(5) O(log n) O(log n) O(log n) O(d) O(1)
(6) no yes yes yes no
(7) asymmetric asymmetric symmetric symmetric asymmetric
Table 2.2. Comparison of DHT designs. The numbers refer to the list of performance
metrics given in Table 2.1. The value d is a system parameter for CAN.
2.1.7 Performance Comparison
DHT designs can be characterized using the performance metrics given in Table 2.1.
Routing in DHTs is generally done in a greedy fashion and resembles lookups in skip
lists [41]. Table 2.2 summarizes the key properties of various existing DHT designs.
The table does not capture properties which are hard to quantify, such as fault-
tolerance. Given a uniform distribution of keys, most existing DHT designs achieve
near perfect load balancing between peers. Hosts that can provide significantly more
resources than others are usually accommodated by associating multiple locations in
the overlay with a single host. In some sense, those hosts are counted as multiple
peers.
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A major limitation of the DHT designs listed in Table 2.2 is that they do not support
routing in restricted route topologies. These DHTs assume that it is generally possible
for any peer to connect to any other peer. However, firewalls and network address
translation (NAT) make this assumption unrealistic over the current Internet, where
large-scale studies have shown that over 70% of machines are NAT’ed [4].
In contrast to the DHT designs from Table 2.2, the Freenet 0.7 routing algorithm
achieves expected O(log n) routing in restricted route topologies under the assumption
that the restricted network topology has small-world properties. The Freenet 0.7
algorithm also attempts to take into account failed nodes and some types of malicious
attacks, although these measures are not the focus of our research.
2.2 Small-world networks
A small-world network is informally defined as a network where the average shortest
path between any two nodes is “small” compared to the size of the network, where
“small” is generally considered to mean at least logarithmic in relation to the size of
the network. Small world networks occur frequently in the real world [59], the most
prominent example being social networks [37].
Watts and Strogatz [59] characterized small-world networks as an intermediate
stage between completely structured networks and random networks. According to
their definition, small world networks with n nodes have on average k edges per
vertex where n > k > log n. They define a clustering coefficient which captures
the amount of structure (clustering) in a given network. Small-world networks are
then networks with a clustering coefficient significantly larger than the coefficients of
completely random networks and with average shortest path lengths close to those of
completely random networks. Watts and Strogatz’s work explains why short paths
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exist in real-world networks.
Kleinberg [28, 29] generalized Watts and Strogatz’ construction of small-world net-
works and gave sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of efficient dis-
tributed routing algorithms for these constructions. Kleinberg’s model for distributed
routing algorithms does not include the possibility of nodes swapping locations, which





Freenet [7] is a peer-to-peer network where the operator of each node specifies which
other peers are allowed to connect to the node [6]. The main reason for this is
to obscure the participation of a node in the network – each node is only directly
visible to the friends of its’ operator. Peer-to-peer networks that limit connections to
friend-to-friend interactions are sometimes called darknets. Given that social networks
are small-world networks and that small-world networks arise easily given a certain
amount of “randomness” in the graph construction, it is realistic to assume that
Freenet 0.7’s darknet is a small-world network. The routing restrictions imposed
on the Freenet 0.7 overlay could technically model arbitrary network limitations;
consequently, an efficient distributed routing algorithm for such a topology should
easily generalize to any small-world network.
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3.1 Network creation
The graph of the Freenet 0.7 network consists of vertices, which are peers, and
edges, which are created by friend relationships. An edge only exists between peers
if both operators have agreed to the connection a priori. Freenet 0.7 assumes that a
sufficient number of edges (or friend relationships) between peers will exist so that
the network will be connected.
Each Freenet 0.7 node is created with a unique, immutable identifier and a ran-
domly generated initial location. The identifier is used by operators to specify which
connections are allowed, while the location is used for routing. The location space
has a range of [0, 1) and is cyclic with 0 and 1 being the same point. For example,
the distance between nodes at locations 0.1 and 0.9 is 0.2.
Data stored in the Freenet 0.7 network is associated with a specific key from the
range of the location space. The routing algorithm transmits GET and PUT requests
from node A to the neighbors of A starting with the neighbor with the closest location
to the key of the request.
3.2 Operational overview
The basic strategy of the routing algorithm is to greedily forward a request to the
neighbor whose location is closest to the key. However, the simple greedy forwarding
is not guaranteed to find the closest peer – initially, the location of each peer is
completely random and connections between peers are restricted (since a peer can
only establish connections to other peers which the operator has explicitly allowed).
Consequently, the basic greedy algorithm is extended to a depth-first search of the
topology (with bounded depth) where the order of the traversal is determined by
the distance of the nodes to the key [51]. Figure 3.1 shows the routing algorithm
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for GET operations in pseudocode. A PUT operation is routed in the same fashion
and reaches exactly the same peers as an unsuccessful GET operation. In addition,
Freenet 0.7 replicates content transmitted as part of a GET response or as part of a
PUT operation at nodes that are encountered during the routing process where the
node’s location is closer to the key than the location of any of the peer’s neighbors.
Both GET and PUT requests include a hops-to-live value which is initially set to
the nodes pre-set maximum and used to limit traversal of the network. Each request
also includes the closest location (in relation to the key) of any node encountered so
far during the routing process.
Figure 3.1. Pseudocode for routing of a GET request.
1. Check that the new GET request is not identical to recently processed requests;
if the request is a duplicate, notify sender about duplication status, otherwise
continue.
2. Check local data store for the data; if the data is found, send response to sender,
otherwise continue.
3. If the current location is closer to the key than any previously visited location,
reset hops-to-live to the maximum value.
4. If hops-to-live of the request is zero, respond with data not found, otherwise
continue.
5. Find the closest neighbor (in terms of peer location) with respect to the key of
the GET request, excluding those routed to already. Forward the request to
the closest peer with a (probabilistically) decremented hops-to-live counter. If
valid content is found, forward the content to sender, otherwise, repeat step 5.
3.3 Location swapping
To make the routing algorithm find the data faster, Freenet 0.7 attempts to cluster
nodes with similar locations. Let L(n) denote the current location of node n. The
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network achieves this by having nodes periodically consider swapping their locations
using the following algorithm:
1. A node A randomly chooses a node B in its proximity and initiates a swap
request. Both nodes share the locations of their respective neighbors and calcu-
late D1(A,B). D1(A,B) is the product of the existing distances between A and
each of A’s neighbors |L(a) − L(n)| multiplied by the product of the existing








2. The nodes also compute D2(A,B), the product of the products of the differences








3. If the nodes find that D2(A,B) ≤ D1(A,B), they swap locations, otherwise
they swap locations with probability D1(A,B)
D2(A,B)
. The deterministic swap always
decreases the average distances of nodes with their neighbors. The probabilistic
swap is used to escape local minima.
The overlay becomes semi-structured as a result of swapping locations; the routing
algorithm’s depth first search can utilize this structure in order to find short paths
with high probability. Sandberg’s thesis [50] shows that the Freenet 0.7 routing
algorithm converges towards routing in O(log n) steps (with high probability) under
the assumption that the set of legal connections specified by the node operators forms
a small-world network. This is a significant result because it describes the first fully
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decentralized distributed hash table (DHT) design that achieves O(log n) routing with
(severely) restricted routes. Most other DHT designs make the unrealistic assumption
that every node is able to directly communicate with every other node [20, 34, 48, 56].
3.4 Content Storage
Each Freenet 0.7 node stores content in a datastore of bounded size. Freenet 0.7
uses a least-recently-used content replacement policy, removing the least-recently-
used content when necessary to keep the size of the datastore below the user-specified
limit.
Our simulation of routing in the Freenet 0.7 network places the content at the
node whose location is closest to the key and does not allow caching or replication
of content. The reason for this is that our study focuses on routing performance and
not on content replication and caching strategies.
3.5 Example
Figure 3.2 shows a small example network. Each node is labeled with its location
(Ln ∈ [0, 1)) in the network. The bi-directional edges indicate the direct connections
between nodes. In a friend-to-friend network, these are the connections that were
specifically allowed by the individual node operators, and each node is only aware of
its immediate neighbors. Similarly, in an ad-hoc wireless network, the edges would
indicate which nodes could physically communicate with each other. While our ex-
ample network lacks cycles, any connected graph is allowed; the small-world property
is only required to achieve O(log n) routing performance but the algorithm will work
(to some extent) for any connected graph.















Figure 3.2. This figure shows an example network with two nodes considering a swap.
The result of the swap equation is D1 = .40 * .35 * .25 * .50 = .0175 and D2 = .30 * .35 *













Figure 3.3. This figure shows the resulting example network after the swap has oc-
curred.
that would cause the nodes with locations 0.60 and 0.90 to perform a swap in order
to minimize the distance product from Equation (3.1). Figure 3.3 shows the new
assignment of locations after the swap. Note that after a swap each node retains
exactly the same set of connections; the only change is in the location identifiers of











Figure 3.4. Illustrates the path of a GET request initiated from the node with location of
0.90. The request is looking for data with a key value of .23, which is stored at the node
identified by the location 0.25. The path that the GET request travels is displayed as
the dotted lines which travel from 0.90→ 0.10→ 0.90→ 0.60→ 0.25 where the data is
found. The data reverses the successful path in order to make it back to the originator.
routing.
Figure 3.4 shows how a GET request would be routed after the swap (with a
maximum value of hops-to-live larger or equal to two). Starting at the node with
location 0.90 and targeting the key 0.23, the node picks its closest neighbor (with
respect to the key), which is 0.10. However, 0.10 does not have the content and also
lacks other neighbors to route to and thus responds with content not found. Then 0.90
attempts its’ second-closest neighbor, 0.60. Again, 0.60 does not have the content,
but it has other neighbors. The 0.25 neighbor is closest to 0.23. The content is found
at that node and returned via 0.60 (the restricted-route topology does not allow 0.25
to send the result directly back to 0.90).
Finally, Figure 3.5 illustrates how Freenet 0.7 routes a PUT request with a max-
imum value of 1 for hops-to-live (in practice, the maximum value would be bigger).
The algorithm again attempts to find the node with the closest location in a greedy
fashion. Once a node C is found where all neighbors are further away from the node,
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the neighbors fail to reset hops-to-live (since 0.90 is closer to the key than they are),















Figure 3.5. The graph on top illustrates the path of a PUT request inserting data with
a key of .96. The request is initiated from node with location 0.25. The path that the
PUT request travels is displayed as the dotted lines which travel from 0.25→ 0.60→
0.90, where the data is stored. The bottom graph shows what happens after a PUT has
found a node whose neighbors are all further away from the key. The node 0.90 (as all
of the predecessors on the path) resets the hops-to-live value to its maximum (in this
case, one) and forwards the PUT request to all of its neighbors. Since these neighbors
are not closer to the key than their predecessor they do not reset hops-to-live. Since




The routing algorithm works under the assumption that the distribution of the keys
and peer locations is random and evenly distributed over the address space. In that
case, the storage and routing load is evenly balanced. In particular, all nodes are
expected to store roughly the same amount of content and all nodes are expected to
receive roughly an equivalent numbers of requests. This key assumption is what gives
Freenet 0.7 both the load balancing qualities that are desired in any DHT or P2P file
sharing system, and is the main assumption that must be true for the algorithm to
achieve O(log n) steps for routing in practice.
The basic idea behind the attack is to de-randomize the distribution of the node
locations of the peers in the network. The attacker tries to cluster the locations
around a particular small set of values. Since the distribution of the keys is still
random and independent of the distribution of the node locations, the clustering of
node locations around particular values results in an uneven load distribution. Nodes
within the interior of the clusters are responsible for basically no content (because
many other nodes are also close to the same set of keys), whereas the load for nodes
on the outside edges of the clusters is disproportionately high.
32
We will now detail two scenarios which remove the vital randomness from the initial
random distribution of node locations which results in the clustering of locations
around particular values. The first scenario uses attack nodes which behave according
to our malicious behavior as described in Section 4.1 inside the network. This attack
quickly and effectively unbalances the load in the network, which causes significant
data loss. The reason for the data loss is that the imbalance causes some nodes to
greatly exceed their storage capacity, whereas other nodes store nothing. A node
exceeds its storage capacity when the protocol dictates that particular node should
store more data than it is configured for; a node faced with this scenario drops the least
recently inserted data. At this point the data is lost, as no node in the network will be
able to find the data even if the original inserter is still present. The second scenario
illustrates how location imbalance can occur naturally even without an adversary due
to churn (which also leads to overload and data loss).
4.1 Active Attack
As described in Section 3.3, a Freenet 0.7 node attempts to swap location identifiers
with random peers periodically. Suppose that an attacker wants to bias the location
distribution towards a particular location, m. In order to facilitate the attack, the
attacker assumes that particular location (i.e. it sets its location tom). This malicious
behavior cannot be detected by the node’s neighbors because the attacker can claim
to have obtained this location legitimately from swapping with some other node. A
neighbor cannot verify whether such a swap has occurred because the friend-to-friend
(F2F) topology restricts communication to immediate neighbors.
Suppose an attacker node A intends to force a swap with a victim N so that
L(N) = m after the swap occurs. Let N have k neighbors. Then A will initiate a
swap request with N claiming to have at least k+1 neighbors with locations favoring a
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swap according to Equation (3.1). Specifically, the locations of the neighbors should
be either close to L(N) or close to the maximum distance from L(A) = m. The
attacker then creates swap requests in accordance with the Freenet 0.7 protocol.
Again, the F2F topology prevents the neighbor involved in the swap from checking
the validity of this information. After the swap, the attacking node can again assume
the original location m1 and continue to try to swap with its other neighbors whose
locations are still random.
The neighbors that have swapped with an attacker then continue to swap in ac-
cordance with the swapping algorithm, possibly spreading the malicious locations.
Once the location has been spread, the adversary again subjects the neighbor to a
swap, removing yet another random location from the network. Figure 4.1 illustrates
the impact of a malicious node on the example network after a few swaps (with the
attacker using m ≈ 0.5). The likelihood of neighbors spreading the malicious location
by swapping can be improved by using multiple attack locations, and switching be-
tween them periodically. Thus, a tradeoff exists between the speed of penetration and
the impact of the attack in terms of causing load imbalances. For our experiments
we typically chose speed over load imbalance because we were interested in having
experiments that were relatively short lived (i.e. a few hours). Of course, in the real
world network attackers could sit on the network for days or longer and likely cause
even larger load imbalances than those we describe in 5.
4.2 Natural Churn
Network churn, the joining and leaving of nodes in the network, is a crucial issue
that any peer-to-peer routing protocol needs to address. We have ignored churn until
1In practice malicious nodes use locations within small distance of m instead of exactly m in part









Figure 4.1. This figure shows the example network after a malicious node has started to
spread locations close to 0.5 by swapping. In this figure the malicious node currently
has location = 0.504
now because the attack described in the previous section does not require it. Intuition
may suggest that natural churn may help the network against the attack by supplying
a constant influx of fresh, truly random locations. This section illustrates that the
opposite is the case: natural churn can strengthen the attack and even degenerate
the Freenet 0.7 network in the same manner without the presence of malicious nodes.
For the purpose of this discussion, we need to distinguish two types of churn. The
first kind, leave-join churn, describes fluctuations in peer availability due to a peer
leaving the network for a while and then joining again. In this case, the network has
to cope with a temporary loss of availability in terms of connectivity and access to
content stored at the node. Freenet 0.7’s use of content replication and its routing
algorithm are well-suited to handle this type of churn. Most importantly, a node
leaving does not immediately trigger significant changes at any other node. As a
result, an adversary cannot use leave-join churn to cause significant disruption of
network operations. Most importantly, honest Freenet 0.7 peers re-join with the
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same location that they last had when they left the network, leave-join churn does
not impact the overall distribution of locations in the network.
The second kind, join-leave churn, describes peers who join the network and then
leave for good. In this case, the network has to cope with the permanent loss of data
stored at this peer. In the absence of adversaries, join-leave churn may be less common
in peer-to-peer networks; however, it is always possible for users to discontinue using
a particular application. Also, often users may just test an application once and
decide that it does not meet their needs. Again, we believe that Freenet 0.7’s content
replication will likely avoid significant loss of content due to realistic amounts of
join-leave churn.
However, natural join-leave churn has another, rather unexpected impact on the
distribution of locations in the Freenet 0.7 overlay. This additional impact occurs
when the overlay has a stable core of peers that are highly available and strongly
interconnected, which is a common phenomenon in most peer-to-peer networks. In
contrast to this set of stable core-peers, peers that contribute to join-leave churn
are likely to participate only briefly and have relatively few connections. Suppose
the locations γi of the core-peers are initially biased towards (or clustered around) a
location α ∈ [0, 1). Furthermore, suppose that (over time) thousands of peers with
few connections (located at the fringe of the network) contribute to join-leave churn.
Each of these fringe-peers will initially assign itself a random location β ∈ [0, 1). In
some cases, this random choice β will be closer to α than some of the γi-locations of
the core nodes. In that case, the routing algorithm is likely to swap locations between
these fringe-peers and core-peers in order to reduce the overall distances to neighbors
(as calculated according to Equation (3.1)). Peers in the core have neighbors close to
α, so exchanging one of the γi’s for β will reduce their overall distances. The fringe
peers are likely to have few connections to the core group and thus the overall product
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after a swap is likely to decrease.
Consequently, even non-adversarial join-leave churn strengthens any existing bias
in the distribution of locations among the long-lived peers. The long-term results of
join-leave churn are equivalent to what the attack from Section 4.1 is able to pro-
duce quickly – most peers end up with locations clustering around a few values. Note
that this phenomenon has been observed by Freenet 0.7 users and was reported to the
Freenet developers – who at the time when this research was originally published, had
failed to explain the cause of this degeneration.2 Since both the attack and natural
churn have essentially the same implications for the routing algorithm, the perfor-
mance implications established by our experimental results described in Section 5
hold for both scenarios.
2https://bugs.freenetproject.org/view.php?id=647, April 2007. We suspect that the clus-
tering around 0.0 is caused by software bugs, resulting in an initial bias for this particular value,




This chapter presents experimental results obtained from a Freenet 0.7 testbed with
up to 800 active nodes. The testbed, consisting of up to 19 GNU/Linux machines,
runs the actual Freenet 0.7 code. For the main results presented here, the nodes are
connected to form a small-world topology (using Kleinberg’s 2d-torus model [28]) with
on average O(log2 n) connections per node. As mentioned previously this is because
we believe (as did the Freenet 0.7 authors/developers) that a small world network
was likely to emerge from the “darknet” construction of the network. However, to be
thorough we also experimented with some other topologies which have been commonly
used in P2P networks. These topologies include: small-world networks without a
2d-torus, a 2d-torus only, a 2d-torus with “supernodes”, and a small-world graph
augmented with supernodes. Supernodes are common in some networks such as [17]
and are very highly connected nodes in the network. The reason for the relatively
small number of nodes (800 and 400) for our experiments is twofold. First, the
estimated size of the actual Freenet 0.7 network based on open experimentation before
we began our research was between 100 and 500 nodes. Therefore we feel that 800
and 400 nodes are good test sizes, as they are larger (or equal to) the size of the real
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network (at least when we began our research). The second reason is that we were
bounded in our experiments by memory. Since Freenet 0.7 is a Java application we
needed to use a Java virtual machine, and after some experimentation we chose the
Sun JavaEE 1.6 SDK. Although we can limit the total amount of memory that the
virtual machine could use, we found that each Freenet 0.7 node required about 64 MB
to run smoothly. Since our lab machines are tasked for other purposes as well as ours,
we found we could only run 50 Freenet 0.7 nodes per machine at any given time.
Using 800 nodes computationally bounded us as well for simulating the routing that
occurs in the Freenet 0.7 network, which meant that an 800 node test took greater
than 5 hours. We found that we could do a test with 400 nodes in about one hour,
and could try many more topologies and attacker configurations with the 400 node
tests.
Each experiment consists of a number of iterations, where each iteration corre-
sponds to 90 seconds of real time in the case of 800 node experiments, and 45 seconds
for the 400 node experiments. In each iteration, nodes are given this amount of time
in order to allow them to swap locations. Then the performance of the network is
evaluated. The main performance metrics are the average path length needed to
find the node that is responsible for a particular key not including dead end paths
or failed searches, the average number of actual hops needed to terminate the query
(including dead end paths), the average number of hops assuming that failed queries
would reach all nodes, the number of “poisoned” locations, and the percentage of the
content originally available in the network that can successfully be retrieved.
All nodes are configured with the same amount of storage space. Before each
experiment, the network is seeded with content with a random key distribution. The
amount of content is fixed at a quarter of the storage capacity of the entire network
(unless otherwise specified). The content is always (initially and after each iteration)
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placed at the node with the closest location to the key. Nodes discard content if
they do not have sufficient space. Discarded content is lost for the duration of the
experiment.
Depending on the goals of the experiment, certain nodes are switched into attack
mode starting at a particular iteration. The attacking nodes are randomly chosen,
and behave exactly as all of the other nodes, except for aggressively propagating
malicious node locations when swapping.
5.1 Distribution of Node Locations
Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the distribution of node locations on a circle
before, during and after an attack. The initial distribution in Figure 5.1 consists of
800 randomly chosen locations, which are evenly distributed over the entire interval
(with the exception of some noticeable clustering around 0.0, which we believe is due
to implementation problems).
The distributions shown in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the effect of two
nodes attacking the network in an attempt to create eight clusters around particular
locations. Note that the number of attackers and the number of cluster locations
can be chosen independently. We chose two attackers because it is believable that
an adversary could run enough nodes to compromise .125 percent of all nodes given
the small size of the actual network, and the choice of eight locations was because
we found that to be a sufficient number for the attack to spread quickly. Figure 5.2
shows the node locations at an early point in the attack, after the 15th attack iteration
(90th overall iterations. Even so, the clustering effect of our location swapping attack
begins to be seen. In 5.3 the attack has been carried out for 75 iterations and the
distribution of node locations can clearly be seen to be skewed towards the eight
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attacker chosen locations. Figure 5.4 shows the last picture of node locations at the
very end of the attack; almost all nodes in the network have been forced to have
an attacker chosen location. This example illustrates quite clearly how easy it is to
remove the randomness necessary in node distributions in the Freenet 0.7 network.
These results are also very typical, in all of the trials we performed with our attackers
on the Freenet 0.7 testbed we saw nearly identical results.
Figure 5.1. Plot of 800 initial node locations before the attack. Plot points increase in
diameter as the density of peers nearby to that location increases.
All the plots use thicker dots in order to highlight spots where many peers are in
close proximity. Particularly after the attack peers often have locations that are so
close to each other (at the order of 2−30) that a simple plot of the individual locations
would just show a single dot. Thicker dots illustrate the number of peers in close
proximity, the spread of their locations is actually much smaller than the thickness
may suggest. The precise method for determining point size is as follows; each point
as plotted on the circle has an x, y coordinate. The Cartesian distance from each
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Figure 5.2. Plot of 800 initial node locations 15 iterations into the attack. Convergence
to the attacker chosen locations begins to be apparent.
Figure 5.3. Plot of 800 initial node locations 90 iterations into the attack. Nearly all
locations have been swapped into those chosen by the attacker at this point.
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Figure 5.4. Plot of 800 node locations after the attack by 2 malicious nodes. The large
plot points indicate the success of the attack in clustering most nodes around the 8
chosen locations.
point i to every other point j ∈ S (where S is the set of all points), is calculated as
Di,j =
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2, and if that Di,j is less than some chosen amount,
the points size value is incremented. To keep the points from growing out of control
the log2 of each size value is taken as a multiplier applied to the base size of the
points as plotted. To give some scale as to how close together two points need to be




The second set of plots show the effectiveness of the attack in the same manner
on the 400 node test network, this time using 16 malicious nodes and the attack
nodes spreading only four locations. These results are impressive given that in this
scenario the attack lasts only 1/4th as long as the 800 node attack. Figure 5.5 shows
the initial plot of node locations, again very evenly spread over the range of possible
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values. Figure 5.6 shows the picture after 25 iterations of the attacked network, and
again the effect of the attack is readily apparent, and Figure 5.7, showing the result
of 50 iterations of attack time tells the same story. Figure 5.8 shows the attack at the
final attack measurement, 75 iterations after the attack began. Another way to see
the effectiveness of the malicious swapping algorithm is shown in Figure 5.9, which
plots the number of poisoned nodes against the run tested. It is clear that shortly
after the attack begins, swaps are forced with all of the malicious nodes immediate
neighbors. This accounts for the large jump near the 25th iteration (when the attack
is initiated). After this spike malicious node locations can only be spread by the
normal swapping algorithm and therefore grows much more slowly, but the increase
remains steady though the returns are diminishing. This is because the attacker needs
to continue to iterate through all possible malicious locations until the neighbor of
the forcibly swapped peer chooses to swap. As the attack location propogates futher
from the malicious node it takes more time to iterate through all the attacker chosen
locations.
Figure 5.5. Plot of 400 initial node locations before the attack.
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Figure 5.6. Plot of 400 node locations 25 iterations into the attack.
Figure 5.7. Plot of 400 node locations 50 iterations into the attack.
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Number of Poisoned Nodes by Run for 16 Attackers with 4 Locations
Num Poisoned/Run Number
Figure 5.9. Plot of the number of nodes that have been “poisoned” by run number.
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# Attackers # Locations Round 1 Round 50 Round 75 Round 100
1 2 0 29 29 39
1 4 0 31 56 67
1 8 0 32 60 69
1 16 0 23 48 80
2 2 0 44 51 59
2 4 0 57 66 75
2 8 0 77 113 137
2 16 0 73 120 145
4 2 0 67 75 86
4 4 0 79 99 114
4 8 1 110 139 155
4 16 0 139 197 224
8 2 0 101 112 121
8 4 0 157 169 178
8 8 0 194 211 225
8 16 0 192 244 256
16 2 0 113 174 183
16 4 0 205 215 231
16 8 0 239 253 266
16 16 0 272 289 299
Table 5.1. Data showing average number of poisoned nodes for varying configurations
of our 400 node testbed and different points in time.
Table 5.1 shows the number of nodes that have been poisoned by attacking the
network at different stages of the attack. The table displays the average number of
bad nodes for varying numbers of attackers and node locations used in our 400 node
testbed. The data is displayed for the first round, where there are no attackers, and
then subsequent rounds 50, 75 and 100 to cover the full duration of the attacks. The
obvious conclusion is that adding more attackers makes the attack work faster and
that using more locations for a particular number of attackers generally also increases
the number of nodes that take on poisonous locations. Round one is included because
it is not a given that there are not always no nodes categorized as poisoned at the
47
beginning of the attack. It is possible for a node to be randomly given a location
which meets the criteria for being a “bad” location. However, this only happened in
one of our experiments out of around 300 trials. It should also be noted that these
averages are rounded up to the nearest whole number.
5.2 Routing Path Length
An important aspect of any routing algorithm is the number of hops that a message
must travel before terminating, either in failure or in success. However there are a
number of different ways to look at the hops that a message travels. In the Freenet
0.7 routing algorithm the maximum number of hops that a message can travel along
a single path is capped at a constant of 10. For most of our hop counts we use
this cap as well. One different metric for counting routing hops that we employ is a
count of how many hops are traversed when route lengths are capped at a very high
number (in our case this is unlimited). We used this measure because we thought
it might give different numbers than the bounded hop count. Figures 5.10 show an
example of this metric for our 400 node network where the attack begins at the 25th
iteration using 8 malicious nodes and 8 locations. The effect of the attack can clearly
be seen in this plot, the number of hops needed for queries initially drop sharply as
the network converges via the swapping algorithm. Once the attack is started the
number of hops jumps back up, although never deteriorating to the length of the
paths at the beginning of the experiment. We plot the mean of the averages over 5
runs in the graphs in this section, leaving out standard deviations for clarity.
Even using this max single path length still leaves some choices for measurements.
As described in Chapter 3, if routing along one path fails then the next closest node






















Avg. Node to Node search (infinite path length) for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations
Avg. Hops/Run Number
Figure 5.10. Graph showing average path length of completed requests when routing
is unbounded.
between the initiator and the destination node, and also a count of all the hops along
all the paths that were traversed prior to the desired node being found. We utilize
both of these measures because it is important to know how many actual nodes are
traversed in a GET or PUT request, though if the cost of initial message to discover
the destination is low, the best path length found could be desired. Figures 5.11 and
5.12 show the number of hops between source and destination and the cumulative hops
traversed including dead-end paths, respectively. As described previously, routing
down a particular path fails when the path length is 10. These graphs show the
large discrepancy between cumulative hops traversed before a query is successful
and counting only those along the successful path. Although the cumulative lengths
decrease for the duration of the experiment (with a noticeable spike when the attack
is started) the lowest number of hops is still high. This may be an important factor
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when considering the costs to the network routing these requests. Counting only the
successful path lengths reveals another aspect of the Freenet 0.7 network; while the
un-converged network has a low number of hops and convergence decreases the hops,




















Avg. Node to Data Search (excluding failed searches) for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations
Avg. Hops/Run Number
Figure 5.11. Graph showing average path length from source to destination of com-
pleted requests.
When searching for data in the network we know a priori whether or not a node
is actually storing data (as we insert it at the appropriate node for each run). For
efficiency we do not attempt to route these requests for missing data, but assume that
such a message would traverse all nodes in the network before terminating. This is
a reasonable assumption given that nodes have O(log n) neighbors and the network
diameter is assumed to be O(log n), which is less than the maximum path length.
This leads to our last measure, where we account for failed searches as taking n hops





















Avg. Node to Data search (including all paths taken) for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations
Avg. Hops/Run Number
Figure 5.12. Graph showing average cumulative path length including all nodes tra-
versed of completed requests.
efficacy of our attack on the Freenet 0.7 network in practice. Figure 5.13 shows very
clearly that path lengths are increased significantly due to our attack for the simple
reason that data is lost due to the high amount of clustering in the network. Note that























Avg. Node to Data search (including failed searches) for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations
Avg. Hops/Run Number
Figure 5.13. Graph showing average path length of requests when failed searches are
assumed to traverse all nodes.
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5.3 Availability of Content
Figures 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 show the data loss in a simulated Freenet 0.7 network
with 800 nodes and two, four and eight attackers respectively. The attackers attempt
to use swapping in order to cluster the locations of nodes in the network around eight
pre-determined values. The resulting clustering of many nodes around particular
locations causes the remaining nodes to be responsible for disproportionately large
areas in the key space. If this content assignment requires a particular node to store
more content than the node has space available for, content is lost.
The attack is initiated after 75 iterations of ordinary network operation. After just
200 iterations the network has lost on average between 15% and 60% of its content,
depending on the number of attackers. Note that in our model, an individual attacker
is granted precisely the same resources as any ordinary user and if the attacker is
deemed the node responsible for the data it will return it when queried. Obviously
if the attacker were truly malicious, it could just drop the data, or refuse to answer
queries that reach it, which would further reduce the storage capacity of the network.
Our results do not show an attacker that takes this further step to hinder data being
found. The figures show the average data loss (with standard deviations) over five
runs of our test bed. For each run, the positions of the attackers were chosen randomly
among the 800 nodes.
The second set of figures shows the data loss in our 400 node network simulations
again with the same number of attackers as the previous three Figures. Figure 5.17
shows the results when two attackers are present, Figure 5.18 shows the results for
four attackers, and Figure 5.19 shows the results for eight attackers. Again the data
is averaged, over three runs. The duration of the trial has an effect on how well our















Time (in iterations of 90 seconds)
Average Loss over time with Std. Dev.
Figure 5.14. Graph showing average data loss over 5 runs with 800 total nodes and 2
attack nodes using 8 attacker chosen locations with the attack starting at iteration 75
(horizontal line depicts attack start time).
swap out malicious locations. Even so, we still see about 20% loss for two attackers,
30% for four attackers, and almost 60% for eight attackers. This is likely due to
the size of the network, as with only 400 nodes the proportion of malicious nodes to
normal nodes is higher.
Some criticisms may come of the fact that we seed the network with an evenly
distributed quarter of the total storage capacity of the network. It may be suggested
that this is too high of an initial amount of data for the distributed system to handle.
This is really a moot point because changing the initial amount of data in the net-
work only increases the time that it takes for an attacker to reduce the total storage
capacity. The locations that malicious nodes propagate are so close together that















Time (in iterations of 90 seconds)
Average Loss over time with Std. Dev.
Figure 5.15. Graph showing average data loss over 5 runs with 800 total nodes and 4
attack nodes using 8 attacker chosen locations with the attack starting at iteration 75
(horizontal line depicts attack start time).
malicious nodes would cause the just as much data to be lost, but for our experiments
to be short lived we chose what might be considered a high initial amount of data.
As discussed in Section 5.2 the length the paths needed in order to find data in the
network also plays an important part; because if the path to the data is too long the















Time (in iterations of 90 seconds)
Average Loss over time with Std. Dev.
Figure 5.16. Graph showing average data loss over 5 runs with 800 total nodes and 8
attack nodes using 8 attacker chosen locations with the attack starting at iteration 75





















Avg. % Failed Searches for 2 Attackers with 8 Locations by Run w/Std. Dev.
Avg. Failed Searches/Run Number
Figure 5.17. Graph showing average data loss in a 400 node network with 2 attack






















Avg. % Failed Searches for 4 Attackers with 8 Locations by Run w/Std. Dev.
Avg. Failed Searches/Run Number
Figure 5.18. Graph showing average data loss in a 400 node network with 4 attack





















Avg. % Failed Searches for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations by Run w/Std. Dev.
Avg. Failed Searches/Run Number
Figure 5.19. Graph showing average data loss in a 400 node network with 8 attack
nodes using 8 attacker chosen locations with the attack starting at iteration 25.
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5.4 Other Topologies
Although the Freenet 0.7 routing algorithm theoretically works best in small world
networks with small world topologies, it is interesting to see how it performs in other
topologies as well. We will demonstrate the differences between these topologies by
comparing the metrics collected as described in Sections 5.2 for each of the topologies
presented. As mentioned earlier, in addition to our “normal” small-world topology
that we use for most of our experiments we introduce four modified topologies. Since
we build our small-world topology by augmenting a 2d-grid, we thought it would be
interesting to compare measurements with an un-augmented 2d-grid. In this case,
each node in the network has exactly four connections corresponding to the nodes
immediately above, below, right and left in the Cartestian system. We also wanted
to see what the results looked like in the absence of the 2d-grid; meaning that we
use the grid coordinates initially to find Cartesian distances between nodes (which
is necessary for small-world construction see Section 3.1 for details) but we do not
necessarily connect nodes into the 2d-grid. If two grid neighbor nodes are connected
based on the randomized connection process they are not removed, so we are not
forcing the absence of original grid connections, just not ensuring they are there.
Our other two topologies use the concept of “supernodes” [17], where certain nodes
exist in the network that are much more highly connected (or universally connected)
than “normal” nodes. We implemented supernodes very simply in our topology con-
struction; when enabled, we selected probalistically 1 percent of the total nodes to be
supernodes, which we augmented with an additional 20 percent of the total peers as
direct connections. The 20 percent of nodes that were added as additional connections
were also uniformly randomly selected from the set of all nodes, unlike the weighted
random selection used for the small-world construction. We used these supernodes in
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Node to Node search for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations
2D Grid Only
2D Grid W/Supernodes
Small World No Grid
Small World W/Supernodes
Normal Small World
Figure 5.20. Average number of hops between source and destination for multiple
topologies when there is no cap on path length.
The graphs in this section each have 5 lines, one for each topology and are labeled
as such. To attempt to achieve a consistent comparison between each topology, we
graph the results from tests with 400 nodes, 8 malicious nodes which are switched
into attack mode at iteration 25, and the malicious nodes rotate through 8 locations
over the course of the attack. The figures follow the same progression as those from
Section 5.2. Figure 5.20 shows the average path length attained for successful queries
when there is no bound on the path length in any one direction. This figure reveals
two things that are very intuitive, the topology with the longest average path lengths
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is the simple 2d-grid and the one with the shortest average path lengths is the small-
world network augmented with supernodes. This is exactly what one would expect
because the 2d-grid is a very sparse graph and short paths do not exist between
arbitrary nodes often. The small-world with supernode topology also should result
in short path lengths because when a supernode is reached with a query it has at
least a 1 in 5 chance of knowing the exact destination, and if not has a large pool
to choose from for a closer node. The other three topologies are grouped together at
about the same place on the graph, which is not unsurprising as they are very similar
topologies as far as the number of total connections go. As in Section 5.2 we generally
see average path lengths decreasing prior to the attack, and slightly increasing after
the attack, with the exception of the supernode and 2d-grid only topologies.
Figures 5.21 and 5.22 again are best interpreted in conjunction. Due to the max-
imum path length for routing being 10, Figure 5.21 seems to show very short path
lengths for all of the different topologies. Again we see that the best performing
topology is clearly the small-world augmented with super-nodes, but at first blush
they all show short paths. However, when the total cumulative hops are taken into
account as in Figure 5.22 we see two more things. First we can see that the cumu-
lative hops are considerably higher than the hops necessary once the data is found,
and we also see that this cumulative number decreases as the network evolves over
time. Again, only successful queries are counted in this figure, so the whole story is
still not revealed.
Figure 5.23 probably provides the best argument for the properties inherent in
small-world graphs based on a 2d-grid topology. In this graph the two small-world
graphs and the 2d-grid augmented with supernodes are shown to be the least effected
by our attack. The 2d-grid with supernodes is relatively the same across the board,




















Node to Data search for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations
2D Grid Only
2D Grid W/Supernodes
Small World No Grid
Small World W/Supernodes
Normal Small World
Figure 5.21. Average number of hops between source and destination for multiple
topologies.
little effect on routing. The small-world with supernodes graph starts out lower than
the normal small-world, but is more wild once the attack begins. The normal small-
world topology performs the best in this instance, although the proportion of poisoned
nodes is still high.
The final figure in this section shows the somewhat results of the number of poisoned
nodes in the network as the attack progresses. This data, shown in Figure 5.24 is
somewhat what one would expect. The normal small-world topology and the small-
world with no grid show the biggest impact of our attack, with ¿50% of nodes poisoned
























Node to Data search for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations (including all hops traversed)
2D Grid Only
2D Grid W/Supernodes
Small World No Grid
Small World W/Supernodes
Normal Small World
Figure 5.22. Average number of cumulative hops necessary for a query to succeed in
multiple topologies.
nodes, presumably because attack locations spread out faster from the malicious
nodes because each node has only 4 total connections, so the likelihood an attacker
chosen location is close to the node’s location goes up. The 2d-grid with supernodes
shows the least number of poisoned locations, though still close to 1
4
of all locations
have been changed. The most surprising result is that of the low number poisoned
for the small-world with supernode topology. However, the growth remains steady























Node to Data search for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations (including failed searches)
2D Grid Only
2D Grid W/Supernodes
Small World No Grid
Small World W/Supernodes
Normal Small World
Figure 5.23. Average routing hops for queries in multiple topologies when failed

























Number of Poisoned Nodes by Run for 8 Attackers with 8 Locations by Topology
2D Grid Only
2D Grid W/Supernodes
Small World No Grid
Small World W/Supernodes
Normal Small World
Figure 5.24. Number of poisoned nodes over time for multiple topologies.
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5.5 Simulation of Churn
Figures 5.25, 5.26, 5.27,, 5.28, 5.29 and 5.30 show the results of a simulation of
join-leave churn on the distribution of node locations in the Freenet 0.7 network. The
total network size used for this simulation was 600 nodes, out of which 500 are stable.
In each round, ten of the remaining hundred nodes drop out of the network and
join as fresh nodes with a new random location and randomly chosen connections.
During each round, the network performs the swap protocol corresponding to about
400ms of a real Freenet 0.7 network. The experiment was done with various different
topologies with similar results. The figures show the results for a topology where the
500 stable nodes are randomly chosen from a small world network, that is, they are
not better connected than any of nodes experiencing churn. In all of our simulations,
the locations rapidly converge towards a small set of all the possible locations.
Figure 5.25. Initial (random) node locations before simulation of join-leave churn.
These results are particularly interesting because they show that the kind of lo-
cation clustering which produced by our attack will also happen in an un-attacked
network with a stable core of peers and churn. This is actually a very likely situation
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Figure 5.26. Distribution of the node locations of the stable core of 500 nodes after 100
rounds of churn.
Figure 5.27. Distribution of the node locations of the stable core of 500 nodes after 2000
rounds of churn.
for any peer-to-peer network, as there are typically peers of developers/enthusiasts
which are likely to be long lived. However a larger number of peers will join and
leave as the network is tried out and then left due to a mismatch between what the
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Figure 5.28. Distribution of the node locations of the stable core of 500 nodes after
10000 rounds of churn.
Figure 5.29. Distribution of the node locations of the stable core of 500 nodes after
50000 rounds of churn.
user wants and what the network provides. As we have shown in our Freenet 0.7
testbed, this kind of clustering is not good for the network, as it puts severe strain on
those peers at the edges of clusters and generally unevenly distributes the processing
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Figure 5.30. Distributions of the node locations of the stable core of 500 nodes after
100,000 rounds of churn.
and storage load of the entire network. In a distributed file system application like
Freenet 0.7, uneven distribution is the the opposite of what the network design was
created to achieve in the first place.
The negative impact of churn may be lessened by swapping locations only with
long lived peers. Recent measurement studies in peer-to-peer networks have shown a
power-law distribution of the uptime of peers; a large percentage of peers have a short
uptime [57]. By adjusting the probability of location swapping to be proportional to
the uptime of both peers, the network may be able to slow down the clustering of
the locations of long-lived peers due to join-leave churn. This is only a conjecture
however, we did not do experiments that show this to be a plausible way to reduce




Various techniques have been proposed that may be able to limit the impact of the
attack described in this thesis, including changing the swapping policy, malicious
node detection, and secure multiparty computation. While some of these strategies
can reduce the impact of the attack, we do not believe that adopting any of the
suggested measures would address the attack in a satisfactory manner. We will now
discuss these measures and their limitations insofar as we have identified them.
One possibility for reducing the effect of the attack proposed in this paper is to
increase the amount of time between attempts to swap, or to have each node in the
network periodically reset its location to a random value. The idea is that the mali-
cious node locations would spread more slowly and eventually be discarded. However,
while this would limit the impact of the attack, this defense also slows and limits the
progress of the network converging to the most fortuitous topology. Specifically, the
amount of time used between swaps must be chosen very carefully. In order to ac-
curately decide on the swap frequency the number of nodes in the network (and the
number of “poisoned” nodes, see below) need to be estimated. Both numbers are
difficult to accurately attain. Also, as shown in Chapter 5, the malicious nodes are
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able to spread the “bad” locations chosen very quickly; within a few rounds of swap-
ping a large proportion of the network has been poisoned. This implies that even
frequent resets and increased swap frequency will do little to stop malicious nodes
to any worthwhile degree. Another real problem with resetting nodes locations peri-
odically is that in Freenet 0.7, data is assumed to be stored (and is actually stored)
at the closest node to the data in the network. This means that when a node resets
its location, the data that it is responsible for will likely no longer be at the closest
node in the network. This would mean that either the data would be unable to be
found, or measures to resend the data out to the correct nearest node would have
to be implemented. Of course for data to stay in a network indefinitely it needs to
be refreshed periodically, but if all nodes reset their locations in a short interval the
network could be flooded with data being routed because its former nearest node is
no longer very near!
Another possible method attempts to detect a malicious node based on knowing
the size of the network. If a Freenet 0.7 node were able to accurately produce a close
estimation of the size of the network, it could detect if an attacker was swapping
locations that are significantly closer than what would be statistically likely based on
a random distribution of locations. The problem with this approach is that in an open
F2F network it is difficult to reliably estimate the network’s size. It is not easy for any
single node to estimate the size of the network because the only information it knows
is how many peers it has (and the peers of its neighbors). But this knowledge may
be completely unrepresentative of the rest of the network. In fact, since the network
is a “darknet” it would be very likely that nodes have largely varying numbers of
peers. Any estimate based on such information would likely be wrong, or at least
vary widely between peers in the network. One way to estimate the number of nodes
in the network would be to take the number of peers and fit them in a distribution
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based on closeness. This would imply that if a node has many neighbors with locations
close to its own, the assumption might be made that the network is very large. This
could be completely wrong, especially when the clustering effect shown previously in
a network with churn is at work! These reason make malicious node detection and
altering the swapping frequency rife with problems.
If there were a way for a node which purported to have a certain number of friends
to prove that all those friends existed, nodes could be more confident about swapping.
The Freenet developers suggested using a secure multiparty computation as a way for
a node to prove that it has n connections. The idea would be for the swapping peers
to exchange the the results of a computation that could only be performed by their
respective neighbors. But because nodes can only directly communicate with their
peers (F2F), any such computation could easily be faked given appropriate computa-
tional resources. Of course, if a node could directly communicate with another node’s
neighbors, then the topology could be discerned. However, in that case the protocol
no longer works for restricted-route networks. This method would also work provided
that there were some trusted third party which gives out public/private key pairs to
each node, but this is an unlikely step for an open peer-to-peer network to take for
two reasons. First, peers joining a network have no reason to trust any third party,
and second the third party would then know all of the members of the P2P network,
which would defeat the idea of Freenet 0.7 being a “darknet” where only a node’s




The new Freenet 0.7 routing algorithm is unable to maintain scalability in networks
where even weak adversaries are able to participate. The performance of the routing
algorithm also degenerates over time (even without active adversaries) if the network
experiences sufficient churn. Churn is unfortunately a very real problem in modern
peer-to-peer networks and is therefore a serious limitation of the Freenet 0.7 darknet
network. The approach chosen (by Freenet developers [24]) to address both of these
problems is to periodically reset the locations of peers. Even this simple seeming so-
lution is fraught with problems; while it limits the deterioration of the routes through
adversaries and churn, such resets also sacrifice the potential convergence towards
highly efficient routes. In order for efficient routes to remain possible the reset period
would need to be chosen properly and to do so would require global knowledge of the
network, which is very much against the idea of a darknet. While Freenet 0.7 was a
good attempt at providing a solution to routing in restricted route networks, there
are some serious problems that remain difficult if not impossible to solve. Secure and
efficient routing in restricted route networks remains an open problem.
This thesis presents a substantial research topic that demonstrates a clear under-
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standing of routing problems in P2P networks as they exist today. We not only
discovered a possible attack vector, but we implemented a real world attack and
demonstrated its feasibility and effectiveness on the Freenet 0.7 network. We also ex-
plained a phenomenon which was observed in practice by Freenet users but remained
unresolved until the presentation of our topic to the Freenet developers. Through
experiments performed on a Freenet 0.7 testbed which are comparable in size and
operation to the actual network we have shown the effects of malicious nodes per-
forming a modified swapping algorithm, and the clustering of nodes, effect on routing
and significant data loss that are a direct result. By running simulations which emu-
lated churn in a network we explained how clusters can form naturally in the Freenet
0.7 network over time, causing similar results as shown in our experiments. This
research took a significant effort (spanning more than 15 months) to achieve our re-
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